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Introduction
A clear understanding of how taxes affect executive compensation can provide valuable insight into fundamental questions in both corporate and public finance. For example, the nature of the process determining executive pay is an area of much debate in the literature on corporate governance. Proponents of the board capture theory, such as Bebchuk and Fried [2003] , argue that managers wield substantial influence in bargaining with boards of directors over their own pay. The magnitude of the compensation response to a change in tax rates yields useful information about the extent of this bargaining power. Furthermore, in light of rising income inequality and concern over government budget deficits, there has been growing interest on the part of policymakers and the general public in increasing top income tax rates. The possibility and desirability of such a policy hinges critically on how high income earners, such as corporate executives, respond to increases in their tax burden.
A recent tax reform in Canada, which greatly increased the effective tax rate on stock option compensation for a subset of firms, provides an excellent opportunity to study these issues. From mandatory public filings, I collect a novel panel dataset of compensation for the top five executives at 600 firms for the four years from 2008 to 2011, which includes a breakdown of the components of pay -the most important of which are salary, cash bonus, share-based compensation (restricted or deferred share units) and stock option grants. There is considerable cross-firm and within-firm heterogeneity in the fractions of compensation derived from these four sources.
Difference-in-differences results, using executives at firms unaffected by the reform as a control group, suggest that this policy-induced tax increase resulted in a reduction in both stock option grants and the fraction of total compensation made up of stock options in the two years immediately following the reform. The point estimate suggests that option compensation fell by approximately the full value of the lost corporate deduction. The natural related question is the extent to which compensation was substituted towards other types of payment whose tax treatment did not change with the reform, such as cash bonuses. There is little evidence of any such substitution response. Hence, the burden of the tax increase appears to have been substantially borne by the affected executives. Overall, these findings are in contrast to much of the existing literature, discussed below, which typically has not found differences in tax incentives to be important determinants of executive compensation.
These results are useful inputs to models of executive compensation bargaining, and the effects of possible policy responses to increasing income inequality, as in Piketty et al. [2011] .
In particular, they imply a nontrivial taxable income elasticity. Whether or not this high elasticity has negative efficiency consequences depends crucially on whether compensation reflects bargaining over rents or the outcome of a competitive market. The observed decreases in compensation are consistent with the idea that executives are in a strong bargaining position with respect to the board of directors. Furthermore, the significant impact of the reform highlights the importance of considering the interplay between firm and personal-level tax incentives as a key determinant of executive compensation.
There is a long literature on the determinants of executive compensation mainly covering firms in the United States, which is well surveyed by Murphy [1999] and Frydman and Jenter [2010] . There is rather less work using Canadian data, despite a similar institutional environment and a variety of regulatory and tax policy changes. However, there are a few papers in this area written using data made available by the Ontario Securities Commission for the 1993-1995 period. Zhou [2000] documents in these data that pay is sensitive to performance and rises with firm size and Zhou [1999] further finds that pay-performance sensitivity is lower in Canada than in the U.S., but that this disparity diminishes as firm size increases.
In the area of tax consequences, Mawani [2003] and Klassen and Mawani [2000] use the same data source to show the importance of tax and financial reporting incentives as determinants of stock option grants and exercises.
1 At the time, accounting rules for stock options meant that such compensation needed only to be disclosed in a footnote of the 1 There is a similar literature on determinants of option compensation in the US, including Matsunaga [1995] , Matsunaga et al. [1992] and Yermack [1995] . financial statements, rather than being expensed like other forms of compensation. Hence, the tradeoffs were quite different than under the current accounting regime, where the value of option compensation must be expensed, and so reduces accounting income.
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A number of other papers have looked specifically at the effects of taxation and regulation on executive pay in the United States. Goolsbee [2000] studies the top personal income tax rate increase of 1993 and finds a significant decrease in taxable income of corporate executives in response. However, it turns out that this effect can be almost entirely attributed to changes in the timing of stock option exercise, with little long run effect. Rose and Wolfram [2000] and Rose and Wolfram [2002] investigate another component of the 1993 legislation, which limited corporate tax deductibility of pay to one million dollars per year, unless it qualified as performance-based.
3 Their conclusion is that this regulation had little effect on salaries or total compensation, which they argue suggests that executive pay is insulated from this On the other hand, on the broader question of taxable income elasticities, there is evidence from outside of the executive compensation literature that the taxable income of high income taxpayers does indeed respond to changes in tax rates. Specifically, Gruber and Saez [2002], using US panel data, and Sillamaa and Veall [2001] , using Canadian data to investigate a 1988 rate reform, find the highest taxable income elasticities for high income taxpayers. To some extent, my study bridges the gap between findings such as these and a general lack of evidence for tax effects on executive compensation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses how stock options are taxed in Canada, both before and after the reform, Section 3 describes the executive compensation data, Section 4 describes the theoretical considerations underlying the determination of executive compensation and what they predict about the effects of the reform, Section 5 presents the results of regressions attempting to uncover the causal effect of the reform on compensation and Section 6 concludes.
Stock Option Taxation and the 2010 Reform
A typical employee stock option is a right granted to the employee to acquire a share for a particular price (the exercise price) until a particular date (the expiration date). The option vests, or becomes exercisable, at the vesting date, typically some time after the grant date.
The exercise price is typically set at the market price of the stock on the grant date of the option. 4 Stock options are a large and important component of executive compensation plans, being granted to about 70% of executives at publicly listed Canadian companies with market capitalization of more than one billion dollars. Stock options make up about a third of compensation for those executives that receive them.
Prior to the 2010 Budget, taxation of stock options in Canada worked as follows: as long as the exercise price of the option was at or above the market price at the grant date, no tax was immediately due. When the option was exercised by the executive, she had to pay tax on the difference between the market price and the exercise price; however, the 'stock option deduction' provided preferential capital gains treatment on the income. 5 Hence, the typical 4 In fact, this is always the case for publicly traded companies in Canada since Toronto Stock Exchange rules prohibit the granting of 'in-the-money' options, that is, those with an exercise price below the market price at grant. Likewise, 'out-of-the-money' grants are very rare -Hall and Murphy [2002] note that 94% of option grants to chief executive officers in the S&P 500 in 1998 were 'at-the-money'.
5 This parallels the tax treatment of incentive stock options (ISOs) in the U.S., though these are not case was that the firm never gets a tax deduction, while the executive paid tax at half her personal marginal income tax rate. This tax treatment is illustrated in column (1) of Table   1 .
[Insert Table 1 about here] However, the firm and executive can agree to 'cash-out' the option rather than have it exercised conventionally, whereby the firm makes a cash payment to the executive to cancel the option. The result is a deduction for the corporation, due to the cash outlay, and regular employment income for the executive, as shown in column (2) of Table 1 . 6 Essentially, the status quo on exercise is beneficial tax treatment for the exercisee. With a cash-out, the beneficial tax treatment goes to the firm. Of course, the amount of the cash payment can be adjusted to share the tax savings with the employee in situations where the potential corporate tax benefit is larger. This type of bargain is studied by Mawani [2003] , who finds that cash-outs are predicted by high effective corporate tax rates and strong financial reporting incentives.
The interesting wrinkle to this dichotomy, which forms the basis of my study, is that there is a particular type of stock option which was, before 2010, eligible for beneficial treatment, simultaneously, for both the firm and the employee, as in column (3) of Table 1 . This type of stock option combines a regular option with a stock appreciation right, together called a tandem stock appreciation right (TSAR) and sometimes referred to as an option with a cash settlement feature. When an employee exercised a TSAR, she could elect to receive cash from the firm equal to the excess of the market price over the exercise price, while retaining the stock option deduction, because, ostensibly, a stock option was in fact being exercised. The firm could then deduct this cash payment. The main requirement for a TSAR to receive this beneficial treatment was that the choice to receive cash had to be commonly used in large publicly traded companies.
at the discretion of the employee. 7 For the purposes of the empirical strategy employed in Section 5, it is important to note that the decision to use TSARs, conditional on having a stock option plan, is basically a one time decision, after which the provisions of the stock option plan are modified to include a cash settlement feature. These types of modifications are very infrequent, so that switching back to stand-alone options prior to 2010 appears to have occurred in only a few cases. Furthermore, it is very rare that a firm will issue a mix of TSARs and regular options to executives in the same year -firms choose one type or the other. Only four companies in the sample granted a mix of both types of options in 2009.
In each of these cases, TSARs appear to make up the vast majority of option grants, with the minority of regular options coming either from legacy plans or from a subsidiary of the parent company.
However, a significant change to the 'double deduction' tax treatment for TSARs was announced as part of the federal budget on March 4, 2010. Essentially, both existing and new TSARs would now be treated identically to regular options for tax purposes. The employee stock option deduction is only available if the employer foregoes its deduction (or vice versa). Because the plan must have been set up so that the choice to take cash is up to the employee, the effect of the reform was to remove the corporate deduction, which was worth about 30% of the gain on exercise, depending on the combined federal and provincial statutory corporate tax rate in 2010, and the taxable status of the corporation. Additional evidence that it was in fact the corporate deduction that was lost after the reform, rather than the employee's stock option deduction, comes from investigation of financial statements of firms using TSARs prior to the reform. For example, Rogers Communications, a large telecommunications conglomerate, reported a $40M tax expense for 2010 from the stock option tax change in the tax footnotes of its annual report. This is approximately equal to the firm's reported marginal tax rate for the year multiplied by their existing stock option compensation liability, indicating that they no longer expected to be able to deduct this 7 In addition, the option cannot have been granted in the money, though as discussed above, this requirement is always satisfied for publicly traded firms. Several other aspects of stock option taxation were changed at the same time as the reform of TSAR treatment. Previously, an employee could defer paying tax otherwise due at option exercise until actually disposing of the shares for up to $100K worth of shares per year; this was eliminated for publicly traded companies.
8 Other changes related to options included strengthening of employer withholding requirements, which had previously benefited from an administrative waiver as long as no cash was paid. Lastly, changes were made to alleviate the tax burden on 'phantom income'. This situation arose, largely because of options granted by technology firms prior to the 2001 recession, when employees had exercised options at high prices and then taken advantage of deferral to delay paying tax until many years later.
Unfortunately for these employees, the stock prices of some technology bubble firms never recovered, leaving them with a tax liability much larger than the value of their stock. The budget addressed this issue by limiting the tax liability on the deferred benefit of previously exercised options to the proceeds of the sale.
The effective date for these reforms in the legislation that was eventually enacted was identical to that envisioned in the original budget proposal: the announcement date of March 4, 2010. Overall, this package of reforms increased the effective tax rate on stock options; however, the incremental increase in tax from the TSAR provision was itself quite substantial.
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8 This provision would be of greater importance for option grants to employees at smaller firms or those below the executive level, since the upper limit on deferral was well below the average option grant in my sample. Hence, the marginal incentive change from this provision should not have been too large. Furthermore, notwithstanding the benefits of deferral, Heath et al. [1999] find that employees at a large company in the U.S. almost always used 'cashless exercise' whereby shares are immediately sold with the employee receiving cash for the excess of the market over the exercise price. However, Jin and Kothari [2008] find evidence that stock sales and option exercises by executives are indeed sensitive to personal tax burdens.
9 The budget documents forecasted incremental revenue from the TSAR portion of the reform of about $300M per year over the following five years. As a rough point of comparison, federal government tax expenditure estimates imply that aggregate income from all stock option exercise is about $4-5B per year (with aggregate stock option deductions at half that amount).
Changes to the taxation of stock options may have been expected prior to the 2010 Budget, in particular to address the issue of option-related 'phantom income', as this problem had been discussed in the media in the preceding years. In fact, a pressure group called 'Canadians for Fair and Equitable Taxation' had arisen to lobby the government on precisely this issue. However, the provision related to TSARs appears to have been a genuine surprise to firms and executives. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this fact is that the board of directors of ShawCor, a multinational energy services company headquartered in Toronto, actually introduced TSARs as of March 3, 2010 -one day prior to the announcement of the tax change. On March 31, 2011, the board eliminated the TSAR feature of their stock option plan.
10 Hence, it seems quite likely that it was the beneficial tax treatment of TSARs that led to their introduction and the board of directors must have believed the day prior to the reform that this treatment would continue.
Data
For Canadian firms, executive compensation disclosure requirements are detailed in Form 51-102F6: Statement of Executive Compensation. They require disclosure on the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer and the next three most highly compensated officers of the company in the 'Summary Compensation To construct a panel of executive pay, information was collected from the Summary Compensation 2011 for the 600 largest publicly traded Canadian firms. These tables give the executive's name and position and provide detailed information about seven components of their compensation. Three of the components are non-equity based -they result in cash paid to the executive. These are salary, which typically does not depend on performance, cash bonuses and long term incentive plans. The difference between the latter two is that bonuses depend on only a single year's performance, while long term incentive plans apply to several years.
These forms of compensation are taxed as ordinary income when received by the employee, with a contemporaneous deduction for the corporation.
Several equity-based compensation amounts are reported: the value of stock option grants, 12 discussed above, and the value of share-based awards. The latter category includes restricted stock units and deferred share units. These are grants of stocks (as compared with options to acquire stocks), which typically vest over time. Restricted stock usually vests over three years, while deferred stock must be held until the executive leaves the company.
Tax is paid by the executive at ordinary rates, but these plans are usually structured so that the tax is deferred until the stock is actually received by the executive, some time after the compensation is actually earned.
13 At such time, the corporation would be able to deduct the value of the compensation.
Lastly, firms must report the change in the accrued value of the executive's pension plan, if any, and a residual category, which includes such items as payments for supplementary health or dental insurance and travel and housing allowances. Payments into registered pension another mandatory corporate filing, to collect information on the place of residence of the executives 14 and whether or not they were members of the board of directors.
The main estimation sample was formed by applying the following criteria: the executive must be resident in Canada, to ensure that Canadian tax rules apply, must be employed for the full year, as compensation for a part year worked is difficult to interpret, 15 and must have compensation data available in all four years from 2008-2011. This last requirement ensures that executives were employed at their firm for at least two years prior to the reform and two years after it. This mitigates the concern that compensation for executives who started just prior to the reform or who left the firm just after it is driven by their place in the career life cycle, rather than changes in performance or business conditions. While this induces some survivor bias, it ensures that executives in the sample are more similar to one another, which is important for identification, particularly given the relatively small sample size. Table 2 displays summary statistics for the elements of executive compensation in this sample. These are presented split by whether any options were granted, as this distinction is important in the regression models of Section 5. Compensation variables are winsorized at the 5% level to minimize the influence of outliers, which tend to be one-time special option grants or bonuses.
An interesting supplement to the reported summary statistics is the fraction of total pay derived from each individual component of compensation. For executives not receiving any options, salary makes up half of compensation with another 30% from bonuses and 15% from share-based awards. For the rest of the sample, 30% of compensation comes from options,
at the approximately equal expense of the other three categories. In both cases, pensions and other compensation provide the remaining 5%. There is considerable variation around these fractions both within and across firms.
To identify which firms in the sample were using TSARs in the pre-reform period, I
searched management information circulars, annual information forms and financial statements, either directly for descriptions of the firm's stock option plans or for details of the accounting method used to determine option compensation expense (which indirectly reveals the presence of tandem stock appreciation rights). Of the executive-years in my main estimation sample, about 12% were at firms that used TSARs in the pre-reform period. Without imposing any of the sample restrictions, such as on executive residence, the proportion falls to about 9%.
A rough estimate of the gains on TSAR exercises at firms in my sample for 2009 is $500 million, which is calculated for each firm as the number of options exercised times the difference in the year-end price and the reported average exercise price. This value represents about 10% of economy-wide option gains, as reported in the tax expenditure analysis of the federal government. This number is conservative in the sense that the necessary data on option exercises and prices is not available for all TSAR firms.
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To get firm-specific accounting information, the compensation data were merged with
Compustat and supplemented by share price data from the Canadian Financial Markets
Research Center.
Theoretical Executive Compensation Framework
The effects of the TSAR reform depend crucially on how executive compensation is determined. This process can be decomposed into two interconnected parts. First, firms and executives bargain over total compensation -it is at this stage where board capture might be relevant, or perhaps a competitive market determines this value. This involves explicitly or implicitly splitting the surplus associated with the firm-executive match. Then firms can choose the composition of the compensation package from among multiple forms of compensation, each of which may be taxed in a different way with different non-tax costs and benefits to both the firm and the employee. These non-tax differences could involve inherent differences in risk or accounting treatment, for example. Appendix A develops and solves a simple model along these lines, but the results and intuition thereof, which will inform the empirical analysis, are described in this section.
Applying this framework suggests that, for TSAR companies, option compensation is determined by trading off the tax savings from the corporate deduction against the net non-tax costs. Then, as the reform removes these additional tax savings and so lowers the marginal benefit of using options, 18 optimal option compensation must fall to regain the equilibrium. This implies that prior to the reform, too many options were being granted at these companies relative to the social optimum. Firms and executives were engaged in tax arbitrage, choosing a level of options higher than they otherwise would have at the expense of their silent partner, the government treasury. This causes higher non-tax costs; for example, risk may not be optimally shared between firms and their executives.
At the same time as options are falling, the total surplus generated by the match between firm and executive falls as the tax savings disappear. This will cause executive compensation to fall as well, with the magnitude depending on the executive's bargaining power. If, for example, the executive had been earning the full amount of the surplus, then she will bear the full brunt of the loss in tax savings. With less bargaining power, this loss will be shared and compensation will not fall by as much, a perhaps counterintuitive result.
Whether non-option compensation increases or decreases in response to this change is a more subtle question, depending on the shape of the surplus function and the substitutability of different forms of compensation. Intuitively, as long as there is some substitutability in the executive's utility function and the total surplus does not change too quickly as options decrease, other compensation will increase to partly make up for the decline in option compensation, with the option share of compensation unambiguously declining. The model in Appendix A provides some clarification on these conditions.
To summarize, the theoretical framework suggests that the TSAR reform will cause option compensation and the option share of compensation to fall. The extent of substitution towards non-option compensation and the magnitude of the fall in total compensation depend crucially on the executive's bargaining power.
Empirical Analysis
The basic empirical strategy used to test these predictions about how the tax change affected compensation involves comparing the compensation of executives at TSAR and non-TSAR firms in a difference-in-differences framework. It is first important to understand why some firms chose to use TSARs and some did not, since this distinction is the basis of the identification strategy. Table 3 shows how firm performance and size vary by TSAR status, among firms that used any options. Note that these statistics are implicitly weighted by the number of executiveyears from each firm which satisfy the sample selection criteria. Firms which granted TSARs in the pre-reform years are larger and have exhibited better performance as measured by shareholder return and return on assets. Executive turnover is a bit lower at TSAR firms, while the incidence of promotions for existing employees is slightly higher. While total compensation is about twice as high at TSAR firms, it is reassuring that the option share of this total is similar in each group.
Which firms use TSARs?
[Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 is a list of TSAR firms in the estimation sample along with the industry in which they operate. There does not appear to be any obvious industry clustering, with representation from financial firms, manufacturing and natural resources of various kinds.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
There are a number of possible factors explaining variation in TSAR takeup: differences in cashflow by option type, incomplete information about the tax treatment of TSARs on the part of firms, differences in compensation transparency and differences in accounting treatment. The obvious benefit of TSAR adoption is the newly available corporate tax deduction, so the question is which of these possible countervailing forces was limiting their use to only a minority of firms.
First of all, there would appear to be a cashflow disadvantage to TSARs since these require the firm to make a cash payment to the executive. With a stand-alone option, the cash payment actually goes in the opposite direction, as the executive must pay the exercise price in cash to her employer. However, this apparent difference is misleading since the firm, faced with the exercise of a tandem stock appreciation right, can always sell a share to fund the cash payment to the executive at quite low cost. 19 In fact, this strategy provides a more appropriate comparison between the two choices, since it holds the level of shares outstanding fixed, and dilution is an issue of central interest to existing shareholders.
A second possibility is a lack of information about the tax benefits of TSARs. However, this too is unlikely, as the Canada Revenue Agency issued an interpretation bulletin in 1996
clarifying the requirements for unlocking the beneficial tax treatment. Furthermore, very high profile companies such as the Bank of Nova Scotia, one of the largest banks in Canada, and the oil refiner Suncor use tandem options and explicitly discuss them in their financial statements, which makes it quite implausible that the rest of the companies in the sample did not have sufficient information to take advantage of TSARs if they so desired.
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Public disclosure requirements have been shown, for example by Murphy [1996] , to be an important determinant of executive compensation. This mechanism would be relevant if one type of option compensation was more transparent to shareholders than the other, as one could imagine cases where the board of directors and the executive herself might prefer to obfuscate the true level of pay. 21 However, the required disclosure for stock option grant value in the Summary Compensation Table of the Management Information Circular does not differ with the addition of a tandem stock appreciation right -the valuation method does not adjust for any additional benefit to the executive from the cash settlement feature.
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The remaining, and, it would appear, most important cost of using TSARs is the difference in accounting treatment. Since 2003, the fair value method has been required to account for option compensation which means that the expected value of an employee stock option is measured at the grant date and then expensed against accounting income in equal parts over the vesting period. For example, if an option vests over three years, a third of the value of the option grant is deducted from income in each year. On the other hand, TSARs are accounted for in the same way as regular stock appreciation rights, which requires use of the intrinsic value method. Rather than expensing the fair value, at the end of each year, the company must take a compensation expense equal to the current value of the TSAR as measured by the difference between the year-end market price and the option's exercise pricethe 'mark-to-market' liability associated with the option. 23 Accordingly, a firm using TSARs will find that compensation expense increases as its share price appreciates, a potentially important drag on earnings growth. Of course, there is no associated fall in compensation expense when share prices decline if the option is out of the money, so this treatment is not necessarily a useful hedge when the firm performs poorly. Additional evidence on the benefit side of the ledger -that it was actually the tax benefits that were driving take-up of the tandem provision in the first place, comes from the fact that many companies eliminated this provision in the months following the 2010 Budget. with the fact that TSAR firms are larger and more successful, since such companies face 23 Under IFRS 2, which was adopted in Canada starting in 2011, the compensation expense is the recalculated fair market value of the options at year end.
24 Babenko and Tserlukevich [2009] discuss the tax benefits of NQOs, which give rise to a corporate deduction in the U.S. and argue that the positive correlation between stock option exercise and earnings has the beneficial side effect for firms of pushing tax deductions to high profitability, and so high tax rate, years.
25 The argument was ultimately unsuccessful as the Budget provisions were enacted substantively as originally written. The reform was retroactive in the sense of applying to the exercise of even options that had been granted under the original tax treatment.
higher expected tax rates, all else equal. These firms would then place a higher value on the corporate tax deduction associated with TSARs.
Results
The starting point of the empirical analysis is to investigate graphically the evolution of option compensation around the reform for firms using TSARs relative to those using regular options. [Insert Figure 1 about here] Figure 2 shows a similar scatter plot for non-option compensation covering the same sample of executives. The issue here is whether or not some of the apparent decrease in compensation seen in Figure 1 is actually compensation being shifted away from the now more highly taxed options, rather than an actual loss in income for executives. There appears to be some divergence around the reform, with the change in compensation being somewhat larger for TSAR firms. Specifically, non-option compensation increases by 45% at TSAR firms, compared with only 27% at control firms. However, this graphical evidence is suggestive, rather than conclusive, since it could reflect other differences across these two groups. 26 It is also important to control for firm size, as option use certainly increases with firm size, 27 and firms in the sample may be growing differentially over time. Specifically, the regression models include quartile dummies for the latter three variables as a flexible way of allowing for non-linearities in their effects.
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The second set of important control variables is a set of dummies for the role in the company held by the executive, including chief executive officer, president, chief financial officer and chief operating officer. Likewise, dummy variables are included for whether the executive is either a member or the chairman of the board of directors. To the extent that board capture is important, one might expect compensation to be higher for executives with a seat at board meetings, though such a correlation might also reflect the fact that only the best CEOs are also chosen as chairmen of the board. In addition, a dummy variable is included which takes a value of one if the executive's position at the company, as described in the management information circular, has changed from the previous year.
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26 This is particularly important given the financial crisis taking place near the start of the sample, which could have widened differences in firm performance. 27 The raw correlation between the value of option grants and the firm's market capitalization is 0.48. 28 Using polynomials of these three variables yields substantially similar conclusions. 29 Given the sample requirement that the executive be employed by the firm in both years, this typically involves a promotion, which would be expected to result in increased compensation. However, this is relatively rare in my data, occurring for only 3% of executive-years.
Hence the empirical models in what follows are regressions of different measures of executive compensation on firm (or executive) fixed effects, firm size and performance quartile dummies, a set of executive position dummies and, most importantly, the interaction of a post-reform dummy variable covering the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years with a firm-level dummy variable indicating TSAR grants (along with level effects of these dummies). Specifically, the following regression is estimated for each measure of compensation, with i denoting an executive and t the year, and with the fixed effect ω i at either the firm or individual level.
The coefficient on this interaction term represents the estimated causal effect of the reform. This implements a difference-in-differences strategy whereby executives at TSAR firms are the treatment group, and those at firms which grant regular options form the control group. From the theoretical framework, this coefficient is expected to be negative for different measures of option compensation and total compensation, and positive for other forms of compensation if there is any substitution response. Standard errors are always clustered at the firm level to account for the fact that compensation changes for executives employed at the same firm are likely to be positively correlated.
30
To start, we can see from the first column of Table 5 that the fraction of compensation made up of option grants falls for TSAR firms relative to control firms around the reform.
Specifically, this fraction falls by a statistically significant 5.7 percentage points from a base of 33%. Evidently, firms are discouraged from compensating employees with stock options following this reform -strong evidence that compensation responds to changes in its taxation.
[Insert Table 5 about here] The second column of Table 5 shows that option compensation fell by about 28% in response to the reform, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Despite the fixed effects, executive controls and time-varying firm controls, this lines up rather closely with the graphical evidence presented in Figure 1 . The magnitude is consistent with firms being able to maintain the same after-firm-tax stock option expense, 'passing on' the lost deduction to employees in the form of lower stock option grants. Since the fraction of compensation through options for executives receiving any option grants is about a third, this decline in option compensation corresponds on average to a 9% drop in total pay for affected executives, notwithstanding any substitution to other forms of compensation.
The control variables typically enter with the expected signs. In particular, larger firms that yielded better shareholder returns tend to see higher growth in option pay both in absolute terms and as a fraction of total pay. The chief executive officer and members of the board of directors also tend to receive more option grants. The coefficient on the postreform dummy implies that though option compensation for the control group was growing over time, it was doing so at a slower rate than the rest of compensation, as the fraction of compensation from options actually fell over time. This could reflect the impact of the other features of the 2010 Budget related to the taxation of options, which should also have tended to decrease option use.
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 replace the firm fixed effects with 786 individual executive fixed effects. The results are quite similar, notwithstanding an increase in standard errors that is to be expected given the large increase in the number of fixed effects relative to the sample size. The firm size and performance measures do not much change, whereas the executive role dummy variables mostly lose their significance, since their effects are now identified only from executives who change roles, and all position changes in aggregate only add up to 3% of executive-years.
Robustness and Extensions
The main concern in interpreting these results as causal is that we know from Table 3 that TSAR firms are different from non-TSAR firms, particularly by size. Hence, if for some nontax reason, option compensation is falling at large relative to small firms over this period, the estimated treatment effect could be biased downwards. I investigate this possibility in a number of different ways in Table 6 , the first row of which replicates the baseline specifications for the option fraction and logarithm of options from the main results in Table 5 . For the first test, I construct a dummy variable that is equal to unity if the executive's firm was above the median size, as measured by market value, 31 in 2008. Then this dummy variable is interacted with the post-reform dummy and included in the regression to allow for large firms to experience differential changes in option compensation independent of any effects of the TSAR reform. As can be seen in row (2), this addition leaves the estimate of the change in option compensation share close to the original estimate with a similar standard error. The reform's effect on option compensation declines somewhat from 28% to 23% with the inclusion of this new variable, but is still close to significant at the 5% level. The new interaction term itself is insignificant in the fraction regression but negative and significant in the option regression, as would be expected given the decline in the magnitude of the effect. Similarly, in row (3), a dummy for being in the top size quartile in 2008 and its postreform interaction are included. This has essentially no effect on the two main coefficients of interest, and the added interaction is not itself significant in either specification. In row (4), the size measures which are included in all specifications, quartile dummies for market value, are additionally interacted with the post-reform dummy. This approach is similar to the two above, though allows each individual firm's size to vary over time. In other words, it lets the compensation behavior of firms vary flexibly by size and time, whereas the previous strategies allowed behavior to vary over time based on firm size, as measured in
2008.
The results are again consistent with the baseline, which is notable given that much 31 Similar results obtain using total assets as the measure of firm size.
of the variation around the reform is eliminated by this set of size-time interactions.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
An alternative approach to dealing with unobservable differences between the treatment and control groups is to use a matching procedure. The estimates in rows (5) and (6) of Table 6 come from averaging the pre-and post-reform periods and then using a nearest neighbor matching procedure based on 2008 market value. Additionally, the CEO and CFO dummy variables are required to match exactly, and quartiles of market value, return on assets and stock returns (as in the main specification) are used as a bias correction, which is particularly important given the relatively small sample size. Both row (5), which uses two matches in the control group for each treatment firm, and row (6), which uses four matches,
show little difference in magnitude with the baseline results. 32 In row (7), a propensity score weighting approach is instead used for the purpose of better matching the treatment and control groups. This involves a first stage calculation of the propensity score using a logit model which explains the TSAR dummy in 2008 by firm level market value, return on assets and stock returns. The inverses of the estimated propensity scores are then used as weights in the baseline specification. Standard errors in this case are calculated by bootstrapping with 100 iterations. For the stock options fraction, the result is essentially the same as in the baseline. For the logarithm of options, the results are consistent though in this case somewhat smaller. Combined with a slightly larger standard error, the coefficient in this model is barely insignificant at the 10% level. Overall, the message of these robustness tests and matching techniques is that differences in composition of the treatment and control groups do not appear to be driving the original results from Table 5 .
In the final two rows of Table 6 , the sample from the baseline results is split based on whether or not the executive is a member of the board of directors. This is a simple test of the idea that executive bargaining power can help to explain the decline in option 32 Note that the standard errors are significantly lower since clustering is infeasible in this specification. Reassuringly, these standard errors are similar to those obtained from the baseline specification in the absence of clustering.
compensation following the reform. If this is so, we would expect to see a larger magnitude response for executives with more bargaining power, such as those who are directors. The results are consistent with this story, as the effects in row (8) for the director sample are indeed stronger than those in row (9) for the non-director sample. However, these differences are not statistically significant, which is not surprising given the limited sample size. If much more data were available, investigation of heterogeneity in the response would be a promising avenue for learning more about the mechanisms underlying these results.
An implicit assumption in these models is that the firm is actually targeting the BlackScholes value of options when making its compensation choices, which seems a reasonable starting point. If, however, the target is actually the number of options or some composite measure of the executive's ownership stake, then using the value, rather than the unobserved target, could be introducing measurement error. A particular concern stems from the fact that the Black-Scholes value of an option is increasing in the firm's return volatility. Hence, if treatment firms happened to experience decreased volatility relative to control firms around the reform, their option grants would mechanically fall in value. However, Figure 3 , which shows how the volatility of monthly returns changed over time for the two groups of firms, demonstrates a reassuring similarity in volatility so that this issue does not appear to be driving the results. 
Substitution Response
The next step is to investigate the substitution response observed in Figure 2 more rigorously. The first two columns of Table 7 present the results of regressions of the logarithm of 33 Given the evidence presented by Bartov et al. [2007] , it could also be the case that managers at treatment firms are manipulating the volatility parameter downward relative to those in the control group by changing the relative weighting of historical and implied volatility. For this to be an issue, it would have to be the case that this relative difference changed around the reform, which seems unlikely, especially given Figure 3 . In any case, such a phenomenon would still represent a response to the reform -a financial reporting effect rather than a real effect.
non-option compensation and total compensation, respectively, for executives also receiving positive option grants. This restriction helps to ensure that the control group against which the treatment effect is measured is composed of executives receiving their compensation from similar sources with a similar risk profile. The coefficient on the interaction term in the first column means that non-option pay increased by 3.3% for treatment firms relative to control firms around the reform. However, with a standard error of 5.8%, this increase is not close to statistical significance. Implicitly combining this small increase with the significant decline in option compensation seen in Table 5 drives a decline of 5.3% in total compensation due to the reform, though the standard error is again too large for a definitive conclusion. Including the large firm dummy and allowing it to vary around the reform does not much change these estimates, except for that of column (4) which increases in magnitude to a 9.6% drop in total compensation for TSAR firms, and becomes significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with executives exercising enough bargaining power prior to the reform to capture most of the tax savings from the corporate deduction. They then lose this part of the surplus after the deduction is eliminated.
[Insert Table 7 about here] The control variables in these regressions have similar effects as in Table 5 , except that performance-sensitivity of non-option pay, at least as measured by its sensitivity to shareholder returns, basically disappears. Evidently, any positive performance-sensitivity of ex ante pay 34 for Canadian executives is coming from changes in the value of option grants.
The positive and significant post-reform dummy implies, as suggested by Figure 2 , that both non-option and total pay grew over the sample period, even conditional on firm performance and growth.
The third and fourth columns add executives who did not receive any options to the estimation sample. This increases the information available to estimate the path of non-option and total compensation for the control group. The tradeoff is that these executives might be more likely to differ from the treatment executives in unobservable ways, which could cause a bias. However, the estimates from this larger sample are very similar: nonoption compensation rises by several percent but the change is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Likewise, total compensation falls, but the standard error remains too large to conclude that this decline is statistically significant. Table 8 splits the results from the previous two tables by year, rather than just pre-and post-reform. This provides more insight into differences between the treatment and control groups in the years prior to the reform and also shows the pattern of adjustment following it. It seems reasonable to expect that any response to the reform should be seen more for the option-only sample but is significant at the 5% level in the broader sample used in the fifth column. This effect is reinforced by the fact that substitution towards non-option compensation actually declines in 2011, though again by much less than the standard error.
Year by Year Results
[Insert Table 8 It is reassuring that the growth in options and the change in the option share are quite similar from 2008 to 2009. Though the difference is not significant, the nontrivial decline in non-option compensation for the control group casts some doubt on a causal interpretation of the year-by-year changes in this variable. Note that the post-reform dummy in Table 7 captures the average difference, which includes this pre-treatment decline, and this is why it shows a small increase in non-option compensation after the reform. A similar caveat applies in interpreting the 2011 coefficient in the full sample of column (5) given the large, though insignificant, difference in the groups from 2008 to 2009.
Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a novel dataset of executive compensation in Canada to take advantage of a tax reform which generated cross-sectional and time series variation in tax incentives for firm stock option grants. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that option compensation fell substantially at affected firms after the reform. There is little evidence that this fall in pay is mitigated by increases in other forms of compensation.
Therefore, it would appear that executives bear a substantial portion of the increased tax burden. This has important consequences for optimal tax policy in the sense that executive pay is indeed sensitive to policy intervention. TSAR firms and their executives appear to have been using a suboptimally high level of option compensation because of the potential tax savings. The observed change in compensation is also consistent with the idea that executives have significant bargaining power, as it suggests that executives had been capturing a large part of the surplus associated with their employment prior to the reform.
These results and dataset also suggest opportunities for future research in this area, for example, by using the jurisdiction of residence of the executives in combination with other subnational and cross-country tax reforms to learn more about tax incidence and the taxable income elasticity of high income taxpayers. Furthermore, the fact that option compensation fell for some firms following the 2010 reform provides a useful instrumental variable with which to assess the effects of executive ownership and performance-based pay on risk-taking 35 and agency conflicts. In particular, it may be the case that the reduction in option grants identified in this paper is associated with reduced risk-taking behaviour by top executives or governance issues associated with reduced alignment between the incentives of managers and shareholders.
A Model of Executive Compensation
In this model, there is a firm and an executive bargaining over the executive's compensation, which is split into two types, x 1 and x 2 . These can be thought of loosely as salary and TSAR options (expressed in present value terms), respectively. The differences between them are twofold: options earn an incremental corporate deduction, with value τ x 2 , but cause non-tax costs given by g(x 2 ), which is increasing and convex. 36 These costs could come from dilution effects, increased risk or differential accounting costs, for example. 37 Then the firm's profit is given by:
where Y is the real surplus created by the firm-executive match, which is reduced by the compensation paid to the executive. The fundamental tradeoff in the model is embodied in the last two terms -the tax advantage of options against their non-tax net costs.
The executive's utility is linear and she cares equally about both forms of compensation.
Then her payoff is just:
It is slightly simpler to model the relative non-tax costs of x 2 as falling on the firm, although the conclusions would be similar if the employee bore some of these costs.
Compensation is determined using Nash bargaining, with the executive having a bargaining weight of β ∈ [0, 1]. This means that compensation is chosen to maximize the net surplus from the match, and then a fraction β accrues to the executive in the form of x 1 and 36 The assumption that taxes affect only option compensation is made simply to minimize notation. Both forms of compensation could face different tax rates at both the firm and executive level without changing any conclusions because the comparative static of interest for thinking about TSARs involves removing or reducing the corporate deduction, leaving all other tax rates fixed.
37 In fact, g(x 2 ) can be negative for low x 2 , perhaps because of positive incentive effects, but the cost turns positive once option compensation is large enough, for the reasons discussed above. Given that it is very rare for executives to receive only one form of compensation, this assumption seems reasonable.
x 2 . Net surplus is calculated by summing the payoffs of the two sides to get:
since the compensation paid is just a transfer from one side to the other. It is trivial to
show that the surplus is maximized when g (x 2 ) = t, given an interior solution with both forms of compensation positive, so that the net non-tax marginal cost is just equal to the marginal benefit of paying another dollar of options, the tax rate τ . Given the assumptions on g(.), this means that the optimal option compensation, x * 2 , is increasing in the tax rate.
The reform studied in this paper involved a reduction in the value of this tax deduction (to zero), so the predicted effect is a decline in the value of option compensation.
The tax deduction causes option compensation to be inefficiently high. If the two bargainers took into account the impact of their choices on government revenues, surplus would be just Y − g(x 2 ) so that the optimal choice x * * 2 would satisfy g (x * * 2 ) = 0 and so the socially optimal choice of options is lower than the privately optimal one. Essentially, the firm and executive agree to take on higher non-tax costs as a form of tax arbitrage.
The next question is what happens to total compensation of the executive, which is equal to βΠ. Hence, the relevant comparative static is β ∂Π(x * 2 ) ∂τ . Using the envelope theorem, this is just equal to βx * 2 > 0. Again, since the reform involves a reduction in τ , this shows that total compensation must fall, and does so more strongly for higher executive bargaining power. This is because the decline in surplus hurts the executive more, the more of that surplus she had been capturing.
Since both total compensation and option compensation decline, the associated change in x * 1 and the option fraction of compensation just depend on whether options decline faster than total compensation or vice versa. Specifically, it can easily be shown that
and
where
is the option fraction of total compensation.
Since βΠ > x 2 at an interior solution, the second condition is less strict than the first.
This means that there are some circumstances where the option fraction increases with τ at the same time as x 1 is increasing (just at a slower rate than x 2 ). Whether these conditions are satisfied depends on the nature of the g(.) function, and in a more general context, on the substitutability between different forms of compensation. As long as the total surplus function is not too sensitive to x 2 , 38 then a decrease in τ , as with the TSAR reform, will result in an increase in other forms of compensation and a decrease in the fraction of compensation paid in options. The increase in other compensation will be lower, the higher the executive's bargaining power. Intuitively, this is again because the executive is hurt more by the decline in surplus from the lost tax savings when she had been capturing a larger share.
A useful extension would involve more complicated non-tax cost functions which depend on both forms of compensation, though the fundamental tradeoff of tax savings versus real costs would still be present. Feedback from compensation choices to bargaining power, perhaps because paying compensation that has the effect of increasing the executive's ownership stake increases her bargaining power, would also be interesting.
γ , the isoelastic case, then it can be shown that these conditions hold as long as γ < 1−τ βτ + 1, which holds for any γ > 1 for sufficiently small τ or β. For the quadratic case, this condition holds as long as τ < 0.5 regardless of the value of β. (3) is for a tandem stock appreciation right. Tax treatment of a typical option in the US would be similar to (2) if tax rates were identical. The choice between (1) and (2) turns on the relevant tax rates in a specific situation and the choice to cash-out the option can be negotiated at the time of exercise. From a purely tax perspective, (3) is strictly preferred for all positive tax rates. The 2010 reform changed the default tax treatment of TSARs from (3) to (1).
(1) Stock Option (2) Cash-out/SAR (3) TSAR Stock Option Gain 100 100 100
Personal Tax  23  46  23 Corporate Tax  0  -30  -30   Total Tax  23  16  -7 After-tax Option Value 77 84 107 The baseline values in row (1) come from the first and third specifications in Table 5 , and so include the full set of firm and executive controls, as well as firm fixed effects, and are clustered at the firm level. The sample size remains 2,428. In row (2), an additional control for firms above the median in total assets, as measured in 2008, is included, as well as its interaction with the post-reform dummy. Similarly, in row (3), a dummy for being in the top size quartile in 2008 and its post-reform interaction are included. In row (4), the size measures (quartile dummies for market value) are additionally interacted with the post-reform dummy. The estimates in (5) and (6) come from averaging the pre-and postreform periods and then using a nearest neighbor matching procedure based on 2008 market value and the CEO and CFO dummy variables, and using quartiles of market value, return on assets and stock returns as a bias correction. The only difference is that in (5), each treatment firm is matched to two control firms, while in (6), four matches are used. In row (7), a propensity score weighting approach is used on the baseline specification, where the propensity score is calculated using a logit model which explains the TSAR dummy in 2008 by firm level market value, return on assets and stock returns. Standard errors in this case are calculated by bootstrapping with 100 iterations. The last two rows split the sample in the baseline specification by whether or not the executive is a member of the board of directors. 
